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Abstract
Aquaculture in Vietnam expanded significantly over the past two decades and contributed to poverty alleviation among 
smallholders. Upstream value chains of shrimp farming in Vietnam are characterized by a high degree of informality, a 
high number of intermediate layers in trade and power asymmetries between farmers, suppliers and buyers. Input sup-
ply such as feed and fingerlings for shrimps account for 60% to 80% of overall cost in white shrimp production. Reducing 
the cost of input supply would therefore significantly improve income and welfare of farmers. Hence, this study focuses 
on the characteristics of business relationships between farmers and input suppliers and explores the possibilities of 
farmers to improve their bargaining position. In particular, the potential of horizontal coordination in the form of coop-
eratives is evaluated. Characteristics of business relationships and possibilities to (individually and collectively) improve 
their bargaining positions of farmers are evaluated within the conceptual frame of global value chains and upgrading. 
The paper argues that despite previous unsuccessful attempts to establish cooperatives, horizontal coordination is an 
important measure in order to counter high dependencies from supply agents. However, in order to be successful, at-
tempts to coordinate need a clear value proposition for farmers, engagement and communication among farmers and 
government support in funding the necessary infrastructure.
Zusammenfassung
Die Aquakultur in Vietnam expandierte in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten erheblich und trug zur Armutsbekämp-
fung unter den Kleinbauern bei. Wertschöpfungsketten der Garnelenzucht in Vietnam sind durch einen hohen 
Grad an Informalität, eine hohe Anzahl von Intermediären im Handel sowie Machtasymmetrien zwischen Pro-
duzenten, Lieferanten und Einkaufsagenten gekennzeichnet. Die Versorgung mit Inputs wie Futter machen 60% 
bis 80% der Gesamtkosten in der Produktion von weißen Garnelen aus. Eine Senkung der Inputkosten würde 
folglich das Einkommen der Produzenten deutlich verbessern. Diese Studie untersucht die Charakteristika der 
Geschäftsbeziehungen zwischen Produzenten und Inputlieferanten sowie die Möglichkeiten für Produzenten, 
ihre Verhandlungsposition gegenüber Inputlieferanten zu verbessern. Insbesondere wird das Potenzial der ho-
rizontalen Organisation in Form von Kooperativen untersucht. Die Charakteristika der Geschäftsbeziehungen 
und die Möglichkeiten zur (individuellen und kollektiven) Verbesserung der Verhandlungsposition von Produ-
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1. Introduction 
Shrimp farming in Vietnam has developed significant 
volumes over the past two decades. The rapid devel-
opment of aquaculture is the result of increased inter-
national and domestic demand and also depleted fish 
resources (Van Duijn et al. 2012: 10ff.). It is in particu-
lar the black tiger shrimp and the white shrimp which 
are cultured in aquacultural ponds. White shrimp 
farming is particularly common in the Mekong Delta, 
where production for international markets is located, 
but it has also developed dynamically in central Viet-
nam, where shrimp farmers produce for the domestic 
and predominantly the Chinese market and small-
scale farmers are the main producers. Development of 
white shrimp production has also been supported by 
political initiatives in order to provide alternative in-
come sources for farmers and thus contribute to pov-
erty reduction (Tran et al. 2013; Lan 2013; Suzuki and 
Nam 2018: 472; Quyen et al. 2020: 2). 
Value chains of white shrimp production in Vietnam 
are characterized by a high degree of informality of 
interrelationships and transactions as well as a prom-
inent role of middlemen who act as purchasing agents, 
brokers of information and also as loan providers. 
Transactions are typically not conducted through 
formal contracts and rely strongly on personal rela-
tionships and trust. The informality of transactions 
has enabled smallholders to establish shrimp produc-
tion in an uncomplicated manner as capital could be 
acquired simply from informal loans of middlemen. 
Higher value production by quality standards for in-
ternational markets however is difficult to achieve 
with the current level of informality because quality 
of shrimp produce cannot be reliably tracked by inter-
national wholesalers (Tran et al. 2013: 7ff.). Such pat-
terns are, in fact, typical also for other regions in the 
Global South, for example in the case of shrimp pro-
duction in Bangladesh (Dannenberg et al. 2016: 180). 
Furthermore, farmers have developed high dependen-
cy from middlemen as well as input agents regarding 
market price, feed and aquaculture techniques ( Joffre 
et al. 2020: 7); as a result, farmers have no room to 
bargain and depend on their capital and information. 
Hence, the question arises how farmers can improve 
their position with regards to other actors along the 
value chain and enable themselves to enter higher 
value development paths by consistently complying 
to international standards. The relationship of farm-
ers and input suppliers is particularly important in 
this regard because commercial feed input for shrimp 
production accounts for 60% to 80% of aquacultural 
production cost (Hasan 2017: 48). The manner how 
farmers can access feed input not only determines 
their economic position but also the quality of shrimp 
they are able to produce. 
Hence, this study explores the relationship of input 
agents and farmers and its role in attempts to upgrade. 
While various studies have explored the governance 
of value chains in aquaculture in Vietnam (such as 
Tran et al. 2013; Ha et al. 2013; Lan 2013; Ponte et al. 
2014; Quyen et al. 2020), thus far, the relationships of 
input suppliers and farmers in aquaculture in Viet-
nam have rarely been explicit focus of investigation. 
Given the high cost of input supply in relation to total 
production cost of farmers, the reduction of input cost 
could significantly contribute to higher incomes for 
farmers. Also, since the establishment of cooperatives 
has been attempted at multiple locations with mixed 
success, this study puts a particular focus on the man-
ner in which cooperatives could successfully contrib-
ute to improving farmers’ bargaining positions vis-
à-vis input suppliers. This study focuses on shrimp 
production in central Vietnam which has developed 
dynamically over the past years has received rela-
tively little attention thus far. The concept of global 
value chains is used as a theoretical framework. The 
study is structured as follows: first, the development 
of Vietnamese shrimp farming in the context of agri-
zenten werden im konzeptionellen Rahmen der globalen Wertschöpfungsketten und insbesondere des upgrading 
bewertet. Der Beitrag argumentiert, dass trotz bisheriger erfolgloser Versuche, Kooperativen zu gründen, die 
horizontale Koordination eine wichtige Maßnahme ist, um die hohen Abhängigkeiten seitens der Produzenten zu 
verringern. Um erfolgreich zu sein, benötigen horizontale Organisationsansätze jedoch einen klar erkennbaren 
Nutzen, Engagement und Kommunikation unter den Produzenten sowie staatliche Unterstützung bei der Finan-
zierung der notwendigen Infrastruktur.
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food networks is briefly outlined. In these sections, a 
particular focus is put on the theoretical framework 
and the role of feed supply. Second, empirical material 
based on stakeholder interviews and complementary 
data and documents is presented and discussed. The 
article concludes with a summary of the main points 
and a brief outline for further research potential.
2. Conceptual frame: agri-food networks, pow-
er disparities and upgrading
Global production networks in agri- and aquacultural 
products are characterized by high fragmentation, in-
ternationalization and a high disparity of power and 
value capture among the various actors (including 
input suppliers, producers, agents, wholesalers and 
retailers) involved (Dicken 2015: 424ff.; Ponte et al. 
2014: 54f.). Agri-food networks tend to be dominated 
by a relatively small number of globally active retail 
firms originating from North America and Europe 
who shape food value chains with disproportionately 
high purchasing power and the formulation of quality 
standards to which producers need to comply in or-
der to be considered as a vendor (Dicken 2015: 440f.; 
Rodrik 2018: 9f.). While there has been a strong em-
phasis in related research on the disparities between 
producers of the Global South who produce for export 
to developed markets mainly in North America and 
Europe (and the whole range of socioeconomic impli-
cations this dichotomy encompasses), the north south-
dichotomy has become increasingly blurred with the 
convergence of lifestyles and consumer behaviour 
in urban centers in developing as well as developed 
countries (Maertens and Swinnen 2006; Dicken 2015: 
424ff.; Beghin et al. 2015: 3).
An important barrier of smallholders in low-income 
countries to deliver to international markets has been 
the implementation of private quality standards by 
large wholesalers who have put increasingly strin-
gent processes in place to monitor compliance (Mar-
tens and Swinnen 2006). Due to the large purchasing 
power of wholesalers and intense competition among 
smallholders, international wholesalers are in dispro-
portionately strong positions of power and can almost 
unilaterally determine the conditions of the business 
relationships between producer and wholesaler (Mae-
rtens and Swinnen 2006: 11ff.; Dicken 2015: 440f.). The 
pressure of smallholders to adhere to international 
quality requirements also influences their relation-
ship with input suppliers (such as for seeds, fertiliz-
ers or, in the case of aquaculture, feed). The input 
side of the relationship mirrors the characteristics of 
farmer-wholesaler relations: as smallholders rely on 
high quality supply in order to produce according to 
international standards, the relatively low number of 
internationally active input suppliers have high bar-
gaining power over prices and business conditions 
(Dicken 2015: 440f.). Nevertheless, smallholders in the 
Global South are generally incentivized to produce for 
international markets. Despite the high power dispar-
ities in international agri-food networks, the formal-
ized production processes and business relationships 
in the context of export-oriented production tends 
to generate higher incomes for smallholders in the 
Global South compared to the highly informal nature 
of relationships which frequently occur in production 
for domestic demand (Maertens and Swinnen 2006: 2, 
24f.; Beghin et al. 2015: 16). 
The interaction patterns and disparities among dif-
ferent actors along the value chain have been concep-
tually described within the literature stream of global 
value chains, which has evolved to be a major stream 
of discussion in economic geography (De Marchi et al. 
2020: 3ff.). This relational perspective on sequences of 
value creation generally seeks to describe and explain 
disparities in power and value capture among actors 
which participate in specific value chains (Gereffi 
et al. 1994; Henderson et al. 2002; Gereffi et al. 2005; 
Coe and Yeung 2015; De Marchi et al. 2020). The litera-
ture stream on global value chains has put a strong 
emphasis on the influence of lead firms (such as brand 
assemblers of retail brands) on the organizational 
configuration of subsequent layers of the value chain 
(Gereffi et al. 2005; Coe and Yeung 2015). Disparities 
of power and value capture among actors along the 
value chain have been described in conceptual con-
tributions as determinants for organizational and 
regional development outcomes. In a much acclaimed 
typology outlined by Gereffi et al. (2005), five types 
of actor relationships were distinguished which fea-
tured different degrees of hierarchy, integration and 
power asymmetry among actors. These types of rela-
tionships are determined by the codifiability of a spe-
cific input, the capabilities of the supply base and the 
complexity of the transaction. Actors compete verti-
cally and horizontally for value (such as in the form 
of profit, knowledge, access to technology etc.) which 
they seek to capture. Within the concept outlined by 
Gereffi et al. (2005), the governance types ‘captive’ 
and ‘market’ are particularly relevant for this article: 
a captive supplier-buyer relationship describes high 
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power asymmetries in which a large number of lowly-
skilled suppliers compete for sales shares among a 
relatively small number of buyers with high purchas-
ing power. In such patterns, buyers are typically in a 
position to basically dictate the conditions of transac-
tion and they consequently result in high dependence 
and low profit margins for suppliers. In contrast, a 
market-based relationship is characterized by a rela-
tively level number of suppliers and buyers and more 
equal power-relationships. Transactions in such an 
environment are determined mainly by prices, which 
are constant matter of negotiation (Gereffi et al. 2005: 
86; Ponte and Sturgeon 2014: 203). Hence, from the 
perspective of smallholders, engaging in the market-
type of transaction is more desirable than captive 
relationships with buyers (this aspect will be elabo-
rated in section 7, discussion and conclusion).
This leads to the question of how an actor can improve 
their position vis-à-vis others for maximizing value 
capture. Conceptually, such a question can be framed 
within the context of different kinds of economic up-
grading, originally outlined by Humphrey and Schmitz 
(2002: 6), who distinguished between four kinds 
though which actors and regions can improve their 
competitive position. These include: 
• process upgrading: transforming inputs into out-
puts more efficiently by re-organizing the produc-
tion system or introducing superior technology;
• product upgrading: moving into more sophisticat-
ed product lines (which can be defined in terms of 
increased unit values);
• functional upgrading: acquiring new functions (or 
abandoning existing functions) to increase the 
overall skill content of activities;
• inter-sectoral upgrading: firms of clusters move 
into new productive activities.
While these types of upgrading refer to strategies 
with regards to product offering and production, it 
is important to point out that actor-specific contexts 
such as institutional environments, the types of re-
lationships with other actors along the value chain 
(especially with regards to mutual dependencies and 
informality) as well as resources available to the actor 
(such as capital or skillset) are critical determinants 
of the type of upgrading which an actor can engage 
in (Pickles et al. 2006: 2319f.; Dannenberg et al. 2016: 
183f.). Further perspectives of upgrading, relating to 
the environmental and social dimensions of offshored 
value creation activities are provided (among others) 
by Poulsen et al. 2016, Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 
2014 and Barrientos et al. 2011, however, given this 
article’s perspective of smallholders, this study fo-
cuses on the economic dimension of upgrading as out-
lined above.
In the context of the aquaculture sectors in Asian 
countries, Ponte et al. (2014) explored upgrading tra-
jectories of farmers and food processors in four Asian 
countries (Bangladesh, China, Thailand and Vietnam). 
In their study, the relationships of Vietnamese farm-
ers with input suppliers and food processors were 
described as ‘relational’, pointing to the informality 
and personal nature of relationships as well as ‘cap-
tive’, meaning that they are in a weak bargaining posi-
tion for business conditions as they face a relatively 
narrow choice of sales channels on the downstream 
and input suppliers on the upstream side, while being 
easily replaceable themselves (Ponte et al. 2014: 56). 
From the perspective of actors who find themselves 
in a captive relationship, the most viable forms of up-
grading are process- and product upgrading while 
a change towards higher value functions within the 
value chain is typically discouraged by lead firms 
and oftentimes not possible due to lack of available 
resources (Ponte et al. 2014: 53f.; De Marchi et al. 
2020: 7). Using the case example of shrimp farming 
in Bangladesh, Dannenberg et al. (2016) pointed out 
that the high degree of informality among actor rela-
tionships in the global south hinders their opportuni-
ties of upgrading (Dannenberg et al. 2016: 183f.). The 
development of cooperatives among smallholders has 
been discussed in various contributions as a measure 
to organize input-supply, increase access of farmers 
to high-value markets, reduce external transaction 
cost and thereby improve their bargaining position 
(Fischer and Qaim 2012: 1256f; Herrmann et al. 2018: 
827f). Cooperatives take various forms in attempt-
ing to support smallholders, including a top-down 
approach of local governments to establish market 
niches and protect smallholder markets and prices 
(Kurakin and Visser 2017: 166ff.), or a bottom-up ap-
proach of self-organization of members, democratic 
control and voluntary participation (Kalogiannidis 
2020: 459). Often, agricultural cooperatives fail due to 
various factors including lack of trust and managerial 
capacity among potential members, lack of adequate 
funding mechanisms, lack of government support and 
lack of cooperative culture (Kalogiannidis 2020; Franc-
esconi and Wouterse 2018).
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From this conceptual backdrop, this article examines 
the research questions of 1) how shrimp farmers in 
central Vietnam access feed input, 2) how current in-
terrelationships between farmers and input suppli-
ers in Thue Thien Hue can be characterized, 3) how 
farmers attempt to improve their bargaining posi-
tions and, 4) with particular focus on the potential of 
cooperatives, which factors determine the success or 
failure of horizontal organization among farmers.
Applying the concept of upgrading as a potential to 
improve the position of Vietnamese smallholders in 
shrimp production by moving beyond their status as 
‘captive’ suppliers, this article adopts a bottom-up-
perspective as outlined by De Marchi et al. (2020: 7). 
The methodology of this study is outlined in the fol-
lowing section.
3. Methodology
This study follows a qualitative approach. The re-
search question is addressed using the methodology 
of the semi-structured interview. For this study, 24 
interviews were conducted with a variety of actors 
including farmers, middlemen, input suppliers and 
local policy makers in the central Vietnamese Thua 
Thien Hue province, which was complemented by sec-
ondary information from reports and statistical data. 
The expert interview is the method of choice in this 
case as this research seeks to characterize the power 
relationships among actors and their implications on 
existing disparities and path dependencies as well 
as strategic possibilities to change the power asym-
metries in given relationships. As such, this study is 
explorative in character and aims to develop an in-
depth understanding of a subject matter rather than 
a large, highly representative sample of cases which 
could be examined quantitively. The interview part-
ners were chosen based on their relevance for the 
research question through direct contacting and 
through the snowball method in which interview 
partners introduced further potential interviewees 
with whom they have either business relationships 
or who were deemed qualified in addressing the sub-
ject. Thua Thien Hue province was selected as the 
place of study, because (as will be shown in the next 
chapter) in recent years the white shrimp industry 
there has developed rapidly and has led to increases 
in income, but also to new dependencies. Thus far, to 
the knowledge of the authors, white shrimp farming 
in Thua Thien Hue province has not yet been focus of 
geographical research. The field work was conducted 
in 2018. The interviews were conducted in Vietnam-
ese language by Chung van Nguyen, who approached 
interview partners directly and also using the snow-
ball-method of finding interview partners through 
existing contacts. The interviews were conducted as a 
field study on-site and took about one hour in average. 
The interviews were recorded and scripted according 
to the guidelines outlined by Dresing and Pehl (2011) 
meaning that they were polished for language and 
readability (such as removal of colloquial language) 
without altering the contents (see also Azevedo et al. 
2017). Based on the research question outlined in the 
conceptual framework, the interviews were designed 
to address the following broad questions:
• How is the interaction between farmers and their 
business partners characterized?
• How can farmers improve their bargaining posi-
tions? 
• What is the potential of cooperatives to support 
farmers in their transactions with suppliers? 
The interview scripts were broadly structured accord-
ing to the main questions. These structured scripts 
then formed the basis for the content analysis and the 
outline and discussion of the empirical results. In ad-
dition to the interviews, complementary documents, 
statistics and media reports were used for this study 
to provide context and additional information.
4. Vietnamese shrimp farming and the role of 
input suppliers
Aquaculture is among the most dynamic growth sec-
tors within meat production systems globally (Ak-
lakur 2018: 385) and in Vietnam, the sector has also 
developed dynamically over the past decades. Coun-
trywide, shrimp production grew from 93,503 tons 
in 2000 to 747,333 tons in 2017 (General statistics of-
fice of Vietnam 2018). With over 330,000 smallholders 
producing shrimp, the sector is highly fragmented as 
farming households are dispersed among areas which 
are often difficult to access (Tran et al. 2013: 330). 
Shrimp produce is mostly sold through several (up to 
five) layers of middlemen who deliver to food proces-
sors and wholesalers (Tran et al. 2013: 330). An esti-
mated 55% of Vietnamese shrimp produce is for ex-
port, with the EU, Japan, the USA and (more recently) 
China being the main export destinations (Lan 2013: 
2). The organization of upstream production systems 
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for white shrimp in Vietnam are largely conditioned 
by the institutional environment, the quality require-
ments of wholesalers and also the local geographic 
conditions. Transactions between farmers and mid-
dlemen are largely informal which contributes to 
making them more flexible and less complex, however 
due to the high informality of transactions in general, 
quality standards (which higher value production for 
international markets usually requires) are almost 
impossible to implement consistently and at scale 
(Van Duijn et al. 2012: 35ff.).
An important layer of shrimp value chains in Vietnam 
is the sourcing of input supply which farmers need for 
production. The supply of commercial feeds allows 
farmers to control growth and produce predictable 
quality. While traditionally, inconsistent inputs like 
trash fish or rice bran have been used as feeds, the use 
of customized industrial feed has been increasingly 
common among smallholders in aquaculture glob-
ally and in Vietnam. As a result, the average annual 
growth rate of global aquafeed production was 5.9% 
between 2006 and 2015 and it has been predicted to 
be at 3.3% in the period from 2016 to 2025 (Salin et al. 
2018: 129). Overall revenues of the aquafeeds sector 
reached 107.82 billion US $ in 2017 (Giri 2017: 8).
Vietnam has 130 aquafeed factories with production 
at 3.77 million tons that respond 85.6% of domestic 
aquafeed demand. Of these, 96 manufacturers pro-
duce pangasius feed, and 68 and 38 manufacturers 
produce black tiger shrimp feed and white shrimp feed 
respectively. Thus, the rate of import for aquafeed has 
been decreasing in recent years, but the market for 
aquafeed is dominated by international companies. 
This applies in particular to the shrimp sector, where 
100% of the feed market is covered by international 
enterprises (VASEP 2018). The demand of aquafeeds 
in Vietnam is increasing and manufacturers are main-
ly focusing their production on the main aquafeeds for 
shrimp and pangasius. Aquafeed production in Viet-
nam could be described as an oligopolistic structure, 
in which five multinational companies occupy the 
market of shrimp feed production, each one with a 
capacity of 20,000 to 40,000 tons per year (Hung and 
Huy 2007: 343). The locations of input supply factories 
as well as the locations of interviewed farmers and in-
put agents are shown in Figure 1.
Using industrial feed is a high cost burden for shrimp 
farmers as it accounts for 60% to 80% of production 
cost. The trading between aquafeed manufactures 
and farmers is facilitated by intermediate agents. 
Fig. 1 Location of interviewed farmers, input agents and input supply factories. Source: cartography: C. Enderle, J. Schwabe and 
C. v. Nguyen; map data: GADM 2018, Esri, HERE, DeLorme, MapmyIndia, ©; OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS user 
community
The challenge of upgrading white shrimp production in central Vietnam and the potential of farming cooperatives
57DIE ERDE · Vol. 152 · 1/2021
Each manufacturer operates their own networks of 
sub-dealers and agents who link manufacturers with 
farmers. The relationship of agents and farmers tends 
to be informal, based on personal trust and payments 
in cash, as well as frequent informal loan provision by 
dealers to farmers (Hung and Huy 2007: 344). As farm-
ers typically produce small scale and lack capital, they 
do not directly link with the input suppliers for feed 
and medicine. Accessibility of farmers to such inputs 
depends on the network of dealers. Usually, farmers 
have only one source for their inputs and therefore al-
most no room to negotiate prices and ensure consist-
ent quality of the supply (Sang and Thao 2015: 34). In 
order to improve their position, farmers typically at-
tempt to increase quality and volume of their output by 
improving management practices, using higher qual-
ity supply and maintaining higher water quality. These 
practices can be broadly described as process- and 
product upgrading, while functional upgrading among 
farmers (besides isolated efforts to self-produce finger-
lings) remains almost non-existent. Typical barriers of 
upgrading for farmers are lack of capital, lack of appro-
priate skills and limited economic incentives to invest in 
upgrading (Ponte et al. 2014: 57, 59f.).
Another important (government supported) measure 
of farmers to improve their bargaining position and 
profitability is the foundation of cooperatives. Horizon-
tal coordination of cooperatives can contribute to the 
diffusion of expertise regarding production processes, 
ensure higher quality production and quality monitor-
ing by adhering to common standards and improve bar-
gaining power towards suppliers and wholesalers by 
aggregating volumes of input purchase and produce (Ha 
et al. 2013: 89). Ha et al. (2013) however have shown 
that the establishment of aquacultural cooperatives in 
Vietnam has met with mixed success. Intensive farming 
cooperatives have generally been more effective in im-
proving farmers’ positions as they more clearly contrib-
ute to reducing risk, are spatially less dispersed, engage 
in more advanced and more standardized production 
techniques and have a higher chance of successfully 
closing contracts with input suppliers and wholesal-
ers (leading to a stronger vertical integration of value 
chains). Extensive farming cooperatives however have 
thus far not shown to be successful in closing contracts 
with commercial partners and feature little proactive 
support from the farmers. Government involvement has 
shown to be important in supporting cooperatives with 
infrastructure funding (Ha et al. 2013: 95f.).
Based on stakeholder interviews, the interrelationships 
and strategies of farmers and dealers of input supplies 
as well as efforts to establish cooperatives in Thua Thien 
Hue province are outlined in the following sections.
5. Relationships between shrimp feed suppli-
ers and white shrimp farmers in Thua Thien 
Hue province
White shrimp farming in the Thua Thien Hue prov-
ince expanded during the last two decades from 258 
tons in 1998 to 4,925 tons in 2017. The introduction of 
white shrimp production contributed to the increase 
in overall volumes as the white shrimp produces high-
er revenue and uses less space compared to the black 
tiger shrimp (Penaeus Monodon), the previously domi-
nant type in shrimp production (General statistics of-
fice of Vietnam 2018). The Thua Thien Hue province 
however features several disadvantages compared to 
locations in southern Vietnam, where shrimp produc-
tion is concentrated as it has a smaller domestic mar-
ket, relatively small farming area, a higher frequency 
of extreme weather events (which can destroy shrimp 
produce) and high distance to input suppliers and 
wholesalers (who are mostly located in the southern 
and northern part of the country).
The quantity of feed used in white shrimp farming de-
pends on the culture season, the stocking density, the 
growth of white shrimp and the investment capacity 
of each farmer. In winter season, farmers will use ap-
proximately 10 to 15 tons for a pond area of 2,500 m2 
to 3,000 m2. In the summer season, white shrimp 
farmers will reduce the quantity of feed. Generally, 
farmers are inclined to buy as much feed as their eco-
nomic situation allows because shrimps grow larger 
the more commercial feed they receive, which will in 
turn increase revenues of farmers. 
Shrimp feed is provided by agencies that are located 
throughout Thua Thien Hue province. However, al-
most all farmers buy their feed from the agency which 
is located closest to them which is not only due to 
higher convenience of spatial proximity but also due 
to the established relationships between the agency 
and the local community. Agents of input suppliers sell 
their feed usually by providing a capital loan which 
the farmers typically pay back after harvest and in 
some cases (if the harvest was not profitable) even 
later. The possibility to obtain capital from agents 
and pay back flexibly is essential for most farmers in 
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order to operate. A farmer who can pay for the input 
up-front will get a significant discount in this context. 
An interviewed agent commented on the trust-based 
relationship with farmers as follows:
My industrial feed agency was established seven 
years ago. Before that farmers bought feed from 
agencies in Hue city. After my business was estab-
lished, almost all farmers in my community came 
to my agency to buy feed. This is because we live in 
the same community, so it is more convenient for 
them to transport the feed from my agency to their 
ponds, than if they had bought from agencies in Hue 
city. Farmers can immediately get feed whenever 
they order and they can pay me the money when 
they have it. We are neighbours, or we have known 
each other and lived together in the same commu-
nity for a long time. The price of feed is usually the 
same across agencies and my agency provides a lot 
of support to producers during the culturing pro-
cess. As a result, 90% of the producers in my com-
munity are buying feed from my agency. The rest 
are buying feed from agencies in Hue City. (Indus-
trial feed agent in Phong Hai commune, Thua Thien 
Hue province)
Farmers who take loans from an agent are bound to 
use the same agent until they have paid back the loan 
even if their prices exceed those of other agents. This 
can result in farmers taking loans elsewhere (such as 
middlemen) in order to pay back the agent, resulting 
in strong one-sided dependencies. Also, using dif-
ferent feed from another agent may be incompatible 
with the production methods and technology which 
a farmer uses at a given time. An interviewed farmer 
explained the conditions as follows:
The price of shrimp feed is listed by each agency. 
Farmers cannot negotiate on the price. The price 
only varies if the farmer pays back the money when 
they buy the feed or after they harvest and sell the 
shrimp. Agencies will give generous discounts if 
farmers pay money when they buy. For instance, 
if I buy one 10kg bag of shrimp feed, the price will 
be 14.08 US $ per bag if I pay immediately, and the 
price will increase by 0.22 US $ per bag if I pay after 
harvesting. (Farmer from Phong Hai community, 
Thua Thien Hue province) 
Risk management strategies of agents towards in-
solvent farmers include flexible repayment times, 
requirements for deposits and also the liquidation of 
farmers’ ponds in case they cannot pay back. As an 
agent described the conditions of payment: 
Only 2% or 3% of farmers can pay cash when they 
buy the feed. The rest always pay after harvesting. 
I allow farmers to buy on credit. If I did not do it 
this way I would not sell my feed. The farmers in 
my community are very kind and we have good 
relationships. I keep a record book and have their 
signatures in the book. Thus, I can get them to pay 
money. If they are not able to pay me back long-
term, then they can sell their shrimp ponds to me 
to settle their debts. (Industrial feed agent, Phong 
Hai commune, Thua Thien Hue province)
Summing up these statements, trust between agents 
for feed input and shrimp farmers is based on the 
implicit commitment of farmers to pay their debts 
and the willingness of agents to provide loans based 
on flexible conditions. These relationships are based 
on previous track record and personal connections 
(rather than formalized processes) and tend to be sta-
ble in the long term. However, the characteristics of 
these relationships result in high asymmetry of risk 
as well as high dependence of farmers on agents: be-
cause most farmers pay their input only after harvest, 
they are bound to be in a long-term relationship with 
one single agent as farmers can change agents only af-
ter paying back all loans (not paying back at all will re-
sult in farmers not obtaining loans in the future). This 
also applies if the quality of feed input is insufficient 
(which may result in low-profit yields). Hence, farm-
ers with low capital at their disposal are entrenched 
in a position as permanent debtors, facing dispropor-
tionate risk and dependence. At the same time, farm-
ers with enough capital to purchase relatively large 
amounts of feed and pay up-front are in a self-rein-
forcing competitive advantage. In general, however, 
dependence of farmers on agents is high, while agents 
outsource economic risk to farmers.
Besides lacking capital, another important reason of 
current dependencies of farmers lies in the current 
setup of infrastructure for delivery and transport. 
Farmers usually require the delivery of input in small 
quantities (one ton for about ten days for a pond area of 
about 3,000 m2) and keep on purchasing input several 
times per season rather than purchasing input once 
for the whole season. This is because farmers usually 
have insufficient storage capacity. Hence, they can 
only transact with agents in close proximity to farm-
ers, who are able to permanently deliver feed input, 
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otherwise transport costs would be too high for small 
quantities. This in particular disconnects farmers in 
central Vietnam (such as the Thua Thien Hue prov-
ince) from input manufacturers because feed supply 
is produced in south and north Vietnam. Hence, deliv-
ery to central Vietnam is thus far exclusively handled 
through a network of agents. The one-sided depend-
ency of farmers from agents and the lacking leverage 
to bargain for lower input costs has detrimental ef-
fects on the sustainability of production techniques 
and quality of produce because in order to reduce 
production costs, farmers have only the option of in-
creasing the stocking density beyond the government 
regulation of 100 to 150 white shrimp seeds per m² to 
densities of up to 350 seeds per m². At such high den-
sity farmers may be prompted to illegally use aquatic 
medicines in order to ensure the health of the shrimps 
during the production period.
Since their individual capacity of improving their 
bargaining position is limited, the seemingly obvi-
ous option of farmers is to collectively organize. As 
described above, cooperatives have been founded 
elsewhere in the country already with mixed success 
and the question remains if and under which circum-
stances cooperatives can help improve the position 
of farmers in the central Vietnamese Thua Thien Hue 
province under the local conditions.
6. The potential of cooperatives to improve the 
bargaining position of farmers
The main issue from the perspective of farmers is 
that in terms of sourcing input for shrimp produce, 
they are in a position of ‘rule takers’ as they only have 
the choice of accepting the conditions which are de-
termined unilaterally by input suppliers and agents. 
Given the high proportion of input supply among the 
total production cost, it is especially the possibility of 
bargaining for lower prices which would improve the 
conditions for farmers. Manufacturers prefer to sell 
input supplies through agents and are generally un-
willing to directly sell to individual farmers because 
they lack the capacity to manage such relationships 
on an individual level. Most importantly, it is difficult 
for input suppliers to assess the solvency of farmers. 
Regarding the Thua Thien Hue province, this problem 
is exacerbated by high geographical distance between 
farmers in central Vietnam and input factories which 
are located in south and north Vietnam (cf. Fig. 1).
In an attempt to improve bargaining positions of 
farmers, the Vietnamese government promoted the 
foundation of cooperatives since 2012, when the co-
operative law was reformed to determine that co-
operative decisions are being made by independent 
members (National Assembly of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam 2012). Cooperatives have been established 
in 61 out of 63 provinces and cities of Vietnam as a 
measure to centralize resources and bargaining pro-
cesses (Hoai 2019). Also in the Phong Hai commune 
in the Thua Thien Hue province, two cooperatives 
were founded with 56 ha of white shrimp farming 
area in 2013 (Doanh Nghiêpvn Viêtnam 2020). These 
efforts have been part of the “New Rurality” (Nông 
Thôn Mới) programme of the Vietnamese central gov-
ernment. However, participation in cooperatives has 
thus far been relatively unsuccessful. In the Phong Hai 
commune of Thua Thien Hue province, only 13 white 
shrimp farmers have joined a cooperative thus far 
and the cooperative structure has failed to negotiate 
better supply prices for the farmers. Several reasons 
deter aquacultural cooperatives in Thua Thien Hue 
province from operating effectively.
First, their establishment is conducted in a ‘top-down’ 
fashion in which the requirements and actual demand 
of farmers are insufficiently taken into account. The 
main driver of establishing cooperatives in Thua 
Thien Hue province was not the initiative of farmers 
but the performance indicators of the “New Rurality” 
programme, in which the establishment of coopera-
tives was one of 19 binding indicators based on which 
local governments were evaluated in their efforts to 
achieve “New Rurality” (Deputy Prime Minister of Viet-
nam 2009). The financial and infrastructural resourc-
es of cooperatives, such as transportation capacity 
and storage space, are insufficient to effectively sup-
port farmers. The government would determine a 
pond area of the cooperative but the farmers would 
need to invest in canvases water pumps and waste-
water systems by themselves up-front, which (due to 
their lacking access to capital) ended up in a mostly 
idle effort.
Second, and this is connected to the first point, the 
farmers themselves engage in highly individual pro-
duction techniques which are based not on (formal) 
sector standards but based on their own experience, 
capital and labour available. This results in highly 
individual needs for farmers regarding volumes and 
types of feed input. High geographical dispersion of 
farmers also contributes to a relatively low willing-
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ness and capacity of farmers to coordinate their pur-
chasing processes of inputs. The head of Dong Hai vil-
lage explained the difficulty of newly establishing a 
local cooperative due to high initial investments: 
White shrimp farming cooperatives were planned 
by the local government. Based on the concept, the 
farmers will prepare white shrimp ponds by them-
selves and all members of the cooperative have to 
contribute money for building a common infra-
structure such as wastewater treatment ponds, 
electricity systems and also for providing basic 
capital of the cooperative. These investments are 
high while white shrimp farming is not always suc-
cessful. Therefore, the farmers were not willing to 
participate in the cooperative.
An interviewed representative of the Phong Hai com-
mune also pointed out the stability of existing rela-
tionships as reason for the difficulties of newly organ-
ized cooperatives: 
Cooperative establishment is intended to help 
white shrimp farmers to improve input and output 
conditions. However, the farmers have had long-
term relationships with local input agents and mid-
dlemen and these persons are quite reputable.
Contrasting the efforts in Thua Thien Hue province, 
one relatively successful cooperative is located in the 
southern Vietnamese Ca Mau province. They man-
aged to negotiate formal agreements directly with 
input suppliers and wholesalers, circumventing the 
intermediate layer of agents. As a result, the farmers 
can buy shrimp seed, shrimp feed, aquatic medicine 
at lower prices compared with farmers who are not 
members of the cooperative. In this scheme, input sup-
pliers also support the farmers in capacity building 
for more effective production and use of their supplies 
(Tepbac 2020). The cooperative model in Ca Mau prov-
ince divides the capital payments for input supplies 
into sequences of 25% which farmers pay up-front 
from their own capital, 35% which farmers receive as 
an interest-free loan and 40% which farmers borrow 
from a bank (Tepbac 2020). This payment scheme, in 
combination with collective purchasing and circum-
venting intermediate layers allows for prices which 
are 10% to 20% lower compared to the currently pre-
dominant modes of interaction between farmers and 
agents of input supply. A representative of the Cai Bat 
cooperative in Ca Mau province commented the suc-
cess of the cooperative as follows: 
Initially, local shrimp farming was organized in-
dividually at everyone’s own preference which re-
sulted in low productivity, inconsistent quality and 
unstable prices. After establishing the cooperative 
in 2012, members of the cooperative were support-
ed by the local government in installing technical 
infrastructure. Successfully closing agreements 
directly with input suppliers and wholesalers were 
critical in the cooperatives success and allowed 
farmers to source at relatively lower prices while 
allowing them to sell at prices above market aver-
age.
One important differentiator of success and failure of 
cooperatives is the initiative of farmers, but also the 
engagement of local governments in terms of reaching 
out to farmers and convincing them of the benefits to 
join the cooperative. Also, the capital expenditure for 
the necessary infrastructure and brokering an agree-
ment with suppliers and wholesalers are critical areas 
in which local government engagement can decisively 
contribute to the successful establishment of a coop-
erative. The empirical findings are discussed within 
the concept of upgrading in the following section.
7. Discussion and conclusion
As other studies (such as Pickles et al. 2006 and Dan-
nenberg et al. 2016) have pointed out, the options of 
entering upgrading trajectories are limited when an 
actor is situated in a ‘captive’ relationship with sup-
pliers and buyers and this holds true for this study 
as well. The main option of white shrimp farmers in 
order to increase profitability is to improve the effi-
ciency of overall production processes, thus, achieve 
process upgrading. Whether farmers can individually 
succeed in improving processes depends significantly 
on the capital which they have available (which de-
termines whether they can install their own storage 
capacities, invest in intensive farming or purchase 
supplies at a discount). Thus, on an individual level, 
differences in available capital are also strong deter-
minants whether farmers are positioned to achieve 
process upgrading, improve their profitability, reduce 
their economic risks and establish long-term competi-
tive advantage over less affluent farmers in the pro-
cess (while their relationship with suppliers remains 
largely unchanged). One focus area in which local and 
provincial policy makers could more strongly engage 
in are efforts to reduce the self-reinforcing effects 
which result from disparities in available capital.
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On the collective level, the findings of the empirical 
material for this study confirm some of the difficulties 
which have been identified also by Ha et al. (2013) for 
the Mekong Delta. The individual production practices, 
geographical dispersion of farmers, low access to capi-
tal for infrastructure investments and low capacities 
of farmers to effectively coordinate demand and align 
production practices are among the most important 
barriers of successfully operating a cooperative in Thua 
Thien Hue province. Capacity building among farmers 
is needed in order to familiarize them with organiza-
tional management, finances and strategic develop-
ment. One other important point is that relationships 
between farmers and supply agents are trust based and 
personal. These routines of transaction and choice of 
business partner are difficult to replace by a formalized 
contracting structure with which farmers are generally 
unfamiliar.
On the supply side, the main use of a collective organi-
zation could be to align input demand, provide storage 
space to allow for high-volume purchases and negotiate 
contracts directly with supply manufacturers. Achiev-
ing these process improvements may require significant 
and perhaps more proactive moderation and invest-
ment by local and provincial governments. This type 
of government moderation has also been outlined by 
Kalogiannidis (2020) as an important pre-requisite for 
the successful organization of agricultural cooperatives 
(Kalogiannidis 2020: 461). Initiatives to self-organize 
should ideally come from proactive farmers themselves 
and can be supported by the government which can help 
facilitate contacts and contract negotiations, provide a 
platform for horizontal coordination and (perhaps most 
importantly) provide capital in the form of subsidies for 
infrastructure investments like storage space as well as 
zero-interest loans which can allow farmers to pay for 
their input supplies up-front. Such initiatives could (but 
are not guaranteed to) improve the bargaining power 
of farmers compared to input suppliers and middlemen 
and help farmers move towards more ‘market’-types 
of supplier-buyer relationships, the benefits of which 
are summarized in Figure 2. Efforts to establish a cen-
tral fund to finance the up-front investments of coop-
erative farming are, in fact, currently underway in the 
Thua Thien Hue province. Also, efforts for stronger 
vertical integration are underway as the cooperative in 
the Phong Hai commune attempts to establish linkages 
with a local food processing company.
Conceptually, the empirical results of this study indicate 
that the manner of existing relationships constrain the 
upgrading options available, as farmers do not feature 
the expertise nor the capital to meaningfully engage 
in functional upgrading. While collective organization 
may seem an obvious step forward for farmers to im-
prove their position, they typically cannot achieve this 
without the significant aid of external resources which 
would typically need to come from state actors and re-
quires willingness of farmers to engage in horizontal 
coordination. Hence, the successful establishment of 
horizontal coordination may need to be preceded by a 
comprehensive communication process in which the 
benefits of coordination for the individual farmer are 
made clear. Also, the provision of capital for infrastruc-
ture investments are critical for success. If farmers 
collectively organize their purchasing process based 
on competitive bidding, it could initiate competition 
among suppliers which would potentially improve the 
farmers’ bargaining position. In such a manner, their 
relationship with suppliers might no longer be ‘captive’ 
but it could transition towards a mode described by Ger-
effi et al. (2005) as ‘market’. Such a mode features lower 
power asymmetries and it would be typical for a rela-
tively even number of buyers and suppliers who negoti-
ate prices based on level competition in a context of low 
complexity-transactions (Gereffi et al. 2005: 90; Fig. 2). 
:
Fig. 2 Upgrading options for farmers and the potential of cooperative farming. Source: own elaboration
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This study focused on the relationships of input sup-
pliers and farmers in shrimp production in central 
Vietnam with the aim to identify the characteristics 
of those relationships and their role in attempts to 
improve the competitive situation of farmers. Exist-
ing initiatives to upgrade the production processes 
of farmers by forming cooperatives have thus far 
not been successful in the Thua Thien Hue province, 
which is mainly due to lacking capital investments in 
infrastructure and low willingness of farmers to co-
ordinate more comprehensively. These deficiencies 
point to a need to engage in a communication process 
to identify and align production processes and input 
demand. This is a prerequisite in order to successfully 
close contracts with input manufacturers, achieve 
process upgrading and higher vertical integration of 
the value chain. Formalizing relationships between 
farmers and input suppliers in stronger vertical inte-
gration of value chains will contribute to standardi-
zation, higher transparency and quality increase of 
production processes which in turn could open new 
(higher value) export markets to farmers, contrib-
uting to the overall development of Thua Thien Hue 
province. 
Regarding the upgrading discussion within the GVC-
framework, this paper confirms the constraints faced 
by ‘captive’ suppliers in engaging in functional up-
grading already identified in previous contributions. 
The article argues that for the successful horizontal 
organization of smallholders, which would empower 
them to move towards a more ‘market’-like type of 
value chain governance, the simultaneous interplay 
of socioeconomic and geographic factors as well as 
institutional framework conditions can be decisive. 
This refers in particular to social and geographic 
proximity among smallholders as well as functional 
government support mechanisms for financing and 
communication as key requirements for successful 
horizontal organization. These factors have been ab-
sent among smallholders in Thua Thien Hue province, 
which can partly explain their failure to self-organize. 
However, since this article is based on an empirical 
study conducted in one location, the findings cannot 
be generalized as they are and would benefit from fur-
ther empirical validation in future studies. 
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